Discussed the future of the Internet at the #G8 summit today. The net must be unrestricted, but a new way to protect copyrights is needed.
—tweet from the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, May 26, 2011
Russian has not develop yet a comprehensive national and international doctrine about cyberspace as the American one (open my post about US cyber diplomacy) but has put in place several efforts to sustain the development of the Information society and define a doctrine of the Information security. In 2000 has adopted the “Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation”which is characterised by four main components:
1. Respect of the constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen in obtaining and using information, spiritual renewal of Russia, the preservation and strengthening of the moral values of society, the traditions of patriotism and humanism, the cultural and scientific potential of the country.
2. Support of the state policy of the Russian Federation in bringing to the Russian and international public accurate information on the state policy of the Russian Federation, its official position on socially significant events in Russian and international life, with the provision of public access to open state information resources.
3. Development of modern information technologies, a domestic information industry, including an industry of informatization and telecommunications means, providing for the needs of the internal market with its products and putting these products in the world market as well as ensuring the accumulation, storage and effective use of national information resources
4. Protection of information resources against unauthorized access, ensuring the safety of information and telecommunications systems both already deployed and being created on the territory of Russia.
As it can be noticed, unlike the American doctrine here the focus is on the preservation of the national integrity and auto sufficiency of the Russian networks concerning the global interconnected nature of the Internet. This doctrine was signed by president Putin and even if his successor Medvedev is a clear enthusiast of the Internet technologies, this nationalistic approach has not changed yet. Indeed in 2008, the president of the Russian Federation approved two documents, “Strategy for the Development of Information Society in Russia” and “Measures for Ensuring the Information Security of the Russian Federation in the Field of Information and Communication Systems use for International Information Exchange”(Brunner & Suter, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009). As underlined by Streltsov the four central goals of the current information policy are:
1. Developing a system of values for russian society
2. Securing support of state activities from national and international public opinion
3. Countering destructive technologies, religious extremism, disinformation of national and international constituencies on state policies
4. Countering disruption of stability and safety of the functioning of the national information infrastructure
Another confirmation of this trend is in Julien Nocetti report “Digital Kremlin: Power and the Internet in Russia” where it is underlined the will to russifying the web and focus the russian internet users on russian Internet framework (denoted by .ru domain but also by all russian language websites) as well as developing national operating systems and other russian native technological tools. The idea itself of the RuNet perfectly represents this will to separate the Russian cyberspace from the larger Internet and if on one side this could be acknowledged as an example of glocalization of the Internet, on the other side it cannot be denied that is representing a menace of ghettization for russian Internet users. Russian policy is currently echoing the Chinese one in the will to create a parallel national world wide web. In doing so it differs from the Chinese approach not in the goal but in the means, as the Open Net Initiative underlines:
“the Russian approach represents a notably different method of controlling Internet activity. Instead of utilizing Chinese-style filtering to control Internet access, the Russian government prefers to employ second- and third-generation techniques such as legal and technical instruments and national information campaigns to shape the information environment and stifle dissent and opposition.”
Russian approach to Cyber security or as they prefer to define it, information security, differs as it can be noticed from the American approach not only for the nationalistic perspective but also because russian strategic goals in the cyber domain are quite different. Russia sees in this domain a way to raise the role of Russia after the collapse of the USSR in way that could improve the national economy and competitiveness and reaffirm its sovereignty in front of the external pressures and potential aggressors. The first attempt to insert information security in the politcal agenda is aged back in 1992 when it was part of the discussions of the Russian security council and since then they have worked in the international arena for:
1. Banning the development, proliferation, and application of instruments of information warfare;
2. Ensuring the security of international information exchange, including the security of information being transmitted via national telecommunications channels;
3. Coordinating the activities of law-enforcement bodies worldwide for preventing computer crime;
4. Preventing unauthorised access to confidential information in international banks, telecommunications networks, and information support systems that are indispensable for maintaining global trade; and sharing information with international law-enforcement organizations fighting transnational organized crime, international terrorism, the spread of narcotics and psychotropic substances, the illegal trade in arms and fissile materials, and human trafficking.
5. Active participation of Russia in all international organizations active in the field of information security, including standardization and certification.(Brunner & Suter, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009)
Russian international engagement
In 1998 Russian federation had a lead role in the resolution “Development in the field of Information and telecommunication in the context of international security” and in the same year it signed with US a “declaration of joint leadership of global response of cyber security” which has remained only on paper (Gady, Austin 2010). Indeed, even if these two countries worked together to face the threats of Y2K and usually recall the will to work together on cyber security issues, since then there have not been seen joint formal output on Cyber security. US has signed in 2001 the “Council of Europe convention on cyber crime” while Russia has not ratified yet and both US and Russia are not partners of the ITU’s IMPACT (Impact International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats) . An important step in the engagement in the international arena have been the creation of the Nato-Russia council established in 2002 where among other topics, Cyber security is in the agenda. So far Russia has tried to reach more bilateral treaties than involvement into multilateral organisation even if it must be underlined the commitment in several UN resolution and bodies such as the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 58/ 32 of 8 December 2003 or the 2009 group of governmental experts GGE setup by UNIDIR at the meeting of the U.N. Commitee on Disarmament and International security. Moreover at the 2010 NATO Lisbon meeting the parties agreed to work together on the possibility of a common missile defense shield and other issues such as Iran, Afghanistan, and cyberwar as noticed by Pabst in 2011 . Aside these engagement it must be also remembered the russian involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
Russia has not set a Cyberspace policy ad hoc office as US but Lomonosov Moscow State University Institute of Information security issues has been officially appointed by the security council of Russia to deal with international cooperation. This choice can be seen as a voluntary step to international engagement with a neutral approach filtered by the academia environment. As it was underlined by Rolan Heickero in “Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations” :
“Whatever the possible explanations or reasons for engaging or not engaging in organizations such as UNIDIR for cyber arms control, as well as cyber crimes, cyber terrorism and cyber espionage it is of great importance to purse international cooperation to hinder or reduce the negative effects of antagonistic cyber operations.”
US, Russia and the Internet: menace or opportunity?
As I have already cited in the post about US cyber policy I particulary like what Gady and Austin wrote in “Russia, the United States, and Cyber Diplomacy: opening doors” :
“Cyber security is a global problem, transcending national boundaries. Traditional concept of national power based on conventional economic, political and military factors are of little consequences in the cyber world”
So far it is not clear if, for US and Russia, the Internet will represent a menace and a chance to further divide theirs view or the opportunity of a common ground where to develop together the future global information society. US has clearly states how it would engage an international multilateral debate while Russia has not clearly acknowledged yet its perspective apart the need of a treaty about cyber armaments. As noted by Markoff and Kramer in 2009 “ The Russian and American approaches — a treaty and a law enforcement agreement — are not necessarily incompatible. But they represent different philosophical approaches.” The EastWest Institute has developed a series of actions to foster partnership and has released two important documents that could be used as background to deepen a possible collaboration. The first is “Russia, The United States and Cyber Diplomacy” in which after assessing the past relationships about these two countries and it suggest four areas where to work together:
1. Public key infrastructure
2. Response to cyber crime
3. International cyber law
4. NATO - Russia cyber exercises and exchanges
Another important document, released for the 2011 Munich Security conference is “Working towards rules for governing cyber conflict” in which experts from both countries have developed five recommendations on how to apply the Geneva and Hague conventions on war to cyberspace:
1. Detangling protected entitities in cyberspace
2. Application of the distinctive Geneva Emblem concept in cyberspace
3. Recognizing new non state actor and netizen power stature
4. Consideration of the Geneva protocol principles in cyber weaponry
5. Examination of a third “Other than war” Mode
These recommendations and areas have been developed by specialists from both sides and not from official governments bodies but they acknowledge the presence of a common ground where both US and Russia can work together to secure the cyberspace. As cited at the beginning Medvedev twitted that
‘The net must be unrestricted”
if and how he will meet the invite of president Obama:
“Today, as nations and people harness the networks that are all around us, we have a choice. We can either work together to realize their potential for greater prosperity and security, or we can succumb to narrow interests and undue fears that limit progress.”
it is still unknown.
Clearly the Cyber space is a domain in which Russia and US have two different approaches but where both understand the consequences of a wrong security move. The cyberspace has moved the geopolitical centre of gravity from territories to information dominance. Create an open and global Internet or a close RuNet is at stake. The Internet has made possible the rise of the information society which both Obama and Medvedev acknowledge is the key space where future economic, cultural and military battles will be fought. The question now is to understand if they will work together to secure this space or Russia will create its own cyberspace and set a precedent that will probably desegregate the entire cyberspace denying the fundamentals of the information society (and as I wrote, also Iran is willing to do).
@11 months ago
“The Internet has become the public space of the 21st century…We all shape and are shaped by what happens there, all 2 billion of us and counting. And that presents a challenge. To maintain an Internet that delivers the greatest possible benefits to the world, we need to have a serious conversation about the principles that will guide us…”
—Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, February 15, 2011
With these words Secretary Clinton envisioned on February 15, 2011 the American approach to the Cyberspace and defines the principle of the American Cyberspace foreign policy. In the same remark she also announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues within the State department and paved the road for the release of the first U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace. For the first time in history a government features Cyberspace as a key objective in its diplomatic agenda and to address this problem it is not only adapting the diplomatic system but also defining a wider framework to address it within the national borders and the international arena.
As Adam Watson theorized “Diplomacy is a dialogue between state”and this dialogue has now a completely new topic in the agenda: Cyberspace and, in particular, its diplomatic dimension, Cyber security. Since we are shaping the future of the humanity based on the extensive capabilities that the Internet gives us, governments are now dealing with Cyber issues not only in the own territories but also in the global and interconnected relationships that are continuously bounding them together. In doing this they are facing a new challenge to understand how to deal with these issues and with a reality which is completely different from what they have experienced before.
In another remark about Internet freedom in 2010 Clinton reminded
“When the telegraph was introduced, it was a source of great anxiety for many in the diplomatic community, where the prospect of receiving daily instructions from capitals was not entirely welcome. But just as our diplomats eventually mastered the telegraph, they are doing the same to harness the potential of these new tools as well. “
These words perfectly embody the challenges related to the discussion of Cyberspace and in particular Cyber security in the diplomatic arena. The challenges that diplomacy is facing require not only a different mind set but also the need to raise a new kind of diplomats prepared to fully master ICT issues and with a strong technical background. New communication technologies not only have enchanted the way a diplomat can work but have also added another domain in which governments have to develop theirs foreign policy. This domain is the Cyber space and it is completely different for what they have experienced before because has no border and involves different actors that are not only state actors. Moreover Cyber Space is flat, has no centre, is interconnected and world wide, is based on share and trust and classical territorial measures cannot be used and for the first time in history can even enable one non state actor to have an unexpected impact to the global scenario.
Adapting US diplomacy
In December 2010 U.S. Department of State released the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). This document envisions the strategic framework of diplomacy and development for the US State Department and the United States Agency for International Development. The report focuses on specifics opportunities to improve and to adapt the American foreign policy to the current challenges that are emerging.
As stated in the opening :
” Traditional diplomacy— the kind conducted in government ministries, palaces, and the headquarters of global organizations— remains an indispensable tool of our foreign policy. But the diplomatic landscape of the 21st century features an increasingly varied set of actors who influence inter-national debates: more states capable of acting on their own diplomatic agendas, a variety of U.S. government agencies operating abroad, transnational networks, corporations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, and citizens themselves. U.S. diplomacy must adapt to this landscape. It must also reshape it.”
This review is based on the experience of U.S. Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review and after assessing the current situation clearly defines the goals of the American foreign policy in the next four years and provides a strategic tool to define policies, activities and future developments of the whole diplomatic sphere. In the report are enlisted series of organisational changes to strengthen the US work on transnational issues that range from economic issues to arms, from counter terrorism to Cyber issues. The report identifies seven global trends that need to be focused and will be the drivers to adapt US foreign policy: the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of nuclear materials, trans-national economic shocks, irreversible climate change, transnational crime, pandemics and infectious diseases and Cyber security. As it can be notice the word reshaping occurs in all the remarks about the American approach to foreign policy, in a world so constantly changing the need to be flexible and adapt to these changes is the only way to face the future threats. In this way it is clear how US State department is trying to handle the challenges that the rising of the information society as defined by the UN, is bringing with itself.
Focusing on the Cyber security topic, the QDDR clear enlists the steps that the US State department need to achieve in order to face all the threats related to the Cyberspace and in doing so it identifies the need to create a new office to co-ordinate all efforts from different agencies and different actors. Cyber security is identified as one of the key objectives also in the national strategy and it concerns not only the dependence of the online networks and theirs disruptions but also the promotion of global prosperity, freedom of information, Internet governance, Cybercrime, copyright issues and every aspect of the life of a nation that is affected by the Internet.
The QDDR openly defines the perimeter and the duties of the office of Cyber Issues that it envisions. First, this office will cover the need to protect the confidentiality of the diplomatic communication. Still in the shadow of the Wikileaks incident, Clinton, during the remarks about Internet freedom (2010) seems to indirectly answer to the Wilson’s Fourteen Points when she says that “Confidential communication gives our government the opportunity to do work that could not be done otherwise.” and in doing this she reaffirms the need of protecting the diplomatic confidentiality in the networking world. Another task of this office will cover the engagement in multilateral and bilateral treaties and will work to reinforce regional cooperation to handle difficult emerging challenges. This will be done with the same attitude that is driving the national effort to enhance the internal Cyber security because as president Obama remarks “Cyber security threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation.” This office will coordinate all the efforts from all other department and federal agencies regarding the full spectrum of Cyber issues that are emerging and that can range from economic threats to intellectual property, from Internet freedom to attacks to American companies, from confidentially to national security, from Cybercrime to Internet pornography. A wide range of issues that are reflected also by the organisational position of the Coordinator of the Office that it is envisioned to report directly to the State Secretary, and will be guided by a Cyber advisory council chaired by the Deputy Secretary and including the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, and the Under Secretary for Management as permanent members.
As it can be noticed this quadrennial review gives the US foreign policy a new strength, envisioning changes and paving the road to a new and reshaped approach to the challenges of the current age, The identification of the need to focus on Cyber security and the creation of an office ad hoc embody this change and this will to adapt the American foreign policy. It represents a milestone in the diplomatic strategy not only because is the first time a government rethink in a global way its foreign policy but also because it sets the example for other governments to follow. At the time of writing it is impossible to say if all guidelines of the review will be followed or will remain only on the page but clearly for what is concerning Cyber issues this is an important step in trying to understand how to build the future and it paves the road to completely news set of issues that governments will have to face in the years that will come.
Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues
The QDDR vision about Cyber security has been confirmed as was also aimed by Robert K. Knake in the report “Internet Governance in an Age of Cyber Insecurity” where he affirmed :
“ The United States should work to develop a stronger set of international regimes to fight crime in Cyberspace, reinvigorate efforts to secure the Internet’s underlying technologies…..The issue ….should be elevated to a new bureau focused on Cyber affairs, and that bureau should be given the mission of working to improve security of Cyberspace through international engagement.”
As announced by Hilary Clinton (2010) and envision in the QDDR, the 22nd of February 2011 the new Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues was established and Christopher Painter was appointed as the first coordinator. This nominee is an important step in the road to the implementation of the QDDR goals and represent also a fundamental step in the road to deal with Cyber space issues from a nation-state point of view. Cyberspace is a new domain of the American military doctrine, it is not only a new battlefield but as stated by Clinton (2011), it is the public space of the 21st century and it is the space where we are putting the fundaments on the future society. To fully understand all the threats and challenges involved in the Cyber space there was the need to create a position that could coordinate and deal with all the different issues concerning the use (and abuse) of network technologies by different state and non-state actors. This position had to recollect all the different inputs and efforts of every agency and US bodies and act as centre of gravity not only for the US Cyber security diplomacy but also for the whole US efforts having an impact on this new space.
This requirements have been confirmed, as stated in the mission of the office it
“will coordinate the Department’s global diplomatic engagement on Cyber issues; serve as the Department’s liaison to the White House and federal departments and agencies on these issues; advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretaries on Cyber issues and engagements; serve as a liaison to public and private sector entities on Cyber issues; and coordinate the work of regional and functional bureaus within the Department engaged in these areas.”
For the first time a government establishes an office completely dedicated to the coordination of Cyber issues : this is a milestone not only because this is formally stated that it is in charge to be the point of contact for any national and international body related to Cyberspace. It clearly states that the US government realised that to face this kind of issues it was obliged to adapt its foreign policy and try to understand how to deal with a space that is not based on clearly defined borders, is not ruled by other governments and were different actors and every day more new threats are emerging and challenging the usual nation-state approach to transnational issues.
U.S. Strategy for Cyberspace
In 2009 the White House released the Cyberspace Policy Review in which it assessed and envisioned the steps to follow to assure a “Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure”. In the near term action plan it was declared the need for a Cyber security policy official and an updated national strategy and it was also suggested to :
“Develop U.S. Government positions for an international Cyber security policy framework and strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of activities, policies, and opportunities associated with Cyber security.”.
To follow the advice of the review, in December 2009 Howard Schmidt was appointed to serve as the U.S. Cyber security Coordinator in the newly created Cyber security Office within the National Security Staff. To further accomplish these goals, those enlisted in the QDDR and to give clear guidelines to the Office of Cyber Issues, the 16th of May 2011 Schimdt presented the first U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace , a document unique in its kind since for the first time a government set in one document the entire agenda about Cyberspace. In this document are identified the key issues of the Cyber foreign policy and with a 360 degree approach it is paved the way for other countries to follow the same steps. As president Obama says in the address of the strategy this is an invite:
”to work together to build a future for Cyberspace that is open, interoperable, secure and reliable. This is the future that we seek and we invite all nation, and people to join us in this effort”
The document opens with a clear statement that building an international Cyberspace policy is not only a act for the American foreign policy but for the future of the Internet itself (2011, p 4). From the diplomatic point of view it represents a fundamental change and set the stage for the future of this activity. Extensive description of the diplomatic efforts are provided and for the first time it clearly defines the diplomatic objective regarding the Cyberspace as:
”.. create incentives for, and build consensus around, an international environment in which states—recognizing the intrinsic value of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Cyberspace—work together and act as responsible stakeholders.” (2011 p 11)
Moreover it clearly identifies regional, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder organisations as important to develop this strategy and affirms that US will work bilateral and multilateral partnerships and private sector and non-government collaborations. The entire document is an example that other countries should follow to deal with Cyberspace issues. It identifies seven main areas of priorities and gives a detailed description of the challenges and environments US diplomats are called into action.
US foreign policy will promote international standards and innovative open markets and focus diplomatic efforts to sustain economy and digital innovation while working on international technical standards from an international, voluntary and consensus based point of view and protecting the intellectual property and confidentiality of enterprises businesses. This clearly underlines the will to preserve the capabilities of internet technologies to sustain the international economic growth, It also handle to preservation of the core characteristics that help the Internet works and put the premises for the development of the public and private sectors partnership.
Enhancing Security, Reliability, and Resiliency: the second area covers the priorities connected to the preservation of the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet and focus the diplomatic action into the engagement in multilateral, bilateral and multi stakeholder organisations. It also establishes, as an important part of the foreign policy, the creation of a global framework of incident management to face transnational issues and aims to create a strong and durable foundation able to preserve global trade and the operation of the every-day-more-and-more interconnected critical information infrastructures.
Extending Collaboration and the Rule of Law: the third area of priorities is the law enforcement one and requires US to fully participate in the international Cybercrime debate focusing on the harmonisation and improvement of existing treaties and creation of new ones. Here it is clear how the US efforts will be focus on bilateral and multilateral basis that will improve the fight against illegal activities and where actions will be also driven by the will to re-enforce existing capacity-building and training programs.
Preparing for 21st Century Security Challenges: in this fourth military area US clearly understands the impossibility of defend the Cyberspace alone due to the interconnected nature of the networks, this represent a major paradigm shift in the approach about security and as it is underlined :
“Cyber security cannot be achieved by any one nation alone, and greater levels of international cooperation are needed to confront those actors who would seek to disrupt or exploit our networks” (2011, p 21)
From a military point of view this is one the major changes in the US security foreign policy and will foster international cooperation and develop a collective capability to face this kind of threats.
Promoting Effective and Inclusive Structures: another important change is in the area of the Internet Governance where US has so far had a neutral approach. Here it is clearly stated how US will promote and enhance the multi stakeholder approach to Internet governance focusing on the preservation of the openness and freedom of the Internet and in particular on the operation of the Domain Name System which represent the Internet’s core.
International Development; in this area US foreign policy and in particular USAID will provide capacity building to countries that need to develop their own Cyber security capacity and will be engaged in educating and helping organising exercises to develop ability of other nations to face Cyber threats.
Internet Freedom: in this last area, the actors to which US wants to deal with, will be not specifically state actors but in particular civil society actors and non government organisations . In this field the American efforts will be focused on the creation of freedom of expression, accessibility and privacy.
As it can be noticed all these areas represent a roadmap not only for the US departments and agencies to develop an effective international Cyberspace policy but they are also a call for the governments and other actors that share the same vision of the future of the Internet and of the Humanity. This document not only represent a first big step in the development of a new kind of policy, the policy of Cyber space, but also give an overview of all the challenges the every government will have to face in the future. It represent not only the agenda of a nation but also the key topics that future diplomats will be asked to deal with in the emergent information society.
Moving forward
As it can be noticed Cyberspace issues and in particular Cyber security represent a new and wide challenge for the diplomatic activity. As Watson observes ” As interdependence grows and the possibility of going it alone diminishes, the larger and more established states of the world are becoming more acutely aware of the need to collaborate”(1984, p26) so the reason of the contemporary major engagement in diplomacy is in the deepness of interconnections that roots the contemporary society and there is nothing more inter connected of the rising information society. Indeed, even if several efforts are put in place by various international organisation such as UN and EU to reach what is defined as information society, this kind of society is at its early stage, even in the developed countries, while others are still behind this, trying to consolidate their state identities and stability. So it is clear that the example of the US foreign policy in this field will pave the road to a new generation of diplomats who will be required to deal with a new set of topics such as the one enlisted in the key ares of the US international Cyberspace policy. They will probably succeed as they did with the telegraph but in doing so they will be required to couple the traditional diplomatic traits with a new attitude.
What we are witnessing is a change in the way states preserve peace and security: this is no more based on a territorial point of view but it is becoming based on a network point of view. The speed of this change depends on the maturity of every single country but it is undoubtable that is the next step in the evolution of states. This networking point of view is completely new and governments are trying to understand how to deal with it and having a nation like US admitting that it is not able to secure the Cyberspace alone and calling for international engagement is an important step in this road to the establish a global information society. Cyber security diplomacy requires this step to move forward: the consciousness that to face this kind of threats the traditional diplomatic attitude need to be adapted. Here it is no more only about a nationalistic interest or a national security, it is a open dialogue about common international interest and common international security because :
“Cyber security is a global problem, transcending national boundaries. Traditional concept of national power based on conventional economic, political and military factors are of little consequences in the Cyber world”
Diplomats that are dealing with Cyberspace policy, and in particular Cyber security, today can make the different for the future of humanity: they can apply the traditional borders-defined nation-state approach dealing with other nation-states without considering the domino impact of the wrong choice on the entire global network or they can assume the multi-stakeholder approach and discuss in regional, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder organisations not only with state actors but also with the civil society, technical community and private sector and try to preserve the inner characteristics that made the Internet possible and consequently the rise of Information society possible.
This, as State Secretary Hillary Clinton underlines (2010), requires to adapt the diplomatic activity and the understanding that more than ever before we have to keep in mind the interconnection of the national and international interests because as president Obama states in the opening of the US International strategy for Cyber space:
“Today, as nations and people harness the networks that are all around us, we have a choice. We can either work together to realize their potential for greater prosperity and security, or we can succumb to narrow interests and undue fears that limit progress.”
@11 months ago
Victory in the past has been synonymous of different achievements: it was the conquer of a territory or the extension of an empire, the peace reached with the defeat of the adversary, the will subdued of the enemy or the complete annihilation of the opponent. What is the meaning of victory in the information age is difficult to define in a clear way since the current situation is characterised by a global interconnected world in which the maturity of states has reached different levels and therefore the idea of victory has different meanings due to these different historical and situational contexts of every conflict . Moreover even if several efforts are put in place by various international organisation such as UN 1 and EU 2 to reach what is defined as information society, this kind of society is at its early stage even in the developed countries, while others are still behind this, trying to consolidate their state identities and stability. Nevertheless it is possible to try to draw some key features of the notion of victory in the information age but in doing this it must be paid particular attention to the contexts and actors involved.
Just after the WWII George F. Kennan in a lecture about “Diplomacy in the Modern World” said:
“Perhaps there can be such a thing as “victory” in a battle, whereas in war there can be only the achievement or non-achievement of your objectives….where your objectives are moral and ideological ones and run to changing the attitudes and traditions of an entire people or the personality of a reign, then victory is probably something not to be achieved entirely by military means or indeed in a short space of time at all” 3.
This sentence can be a good starting point to try defining victory in the contemporary world since it introduces several factors that characterise the current situation. First, we have the difference between the short and long term perspective, than the definition of the objectives and consequently the shift from territorial to ideological and moral achievements. We can describe the temporal shift as a change in the recognition of victory: it is no more a matter of overwhelm another actor in the short term but, in the global and interconnected world, it is mostly the re-establishment of a situation of stability that can pave the road to a postwar balance for considerably “long” period. In fact as Robert Mandel underlines in “Reassessing Victory in Warfare” victory is now made by the interconnection and balance of several elements such as information control, military deterrence, political self determination, economic reconstructions, social justice and diplomatic respect 4. Moreover, and this is clear when we consider all these elements, victory nowadays cannot be defined as a clear idea as it was in the past since currently the majority of the conflicts are characterised by various historical and situational contexts.
Clearly in the contemporary world different actors have different objectives and different interdependences. When we look at the differences between state and armed non-state actors (as defined by Schneckener 5) this is straightforward but, as mentioned above, it must be reminded that there are differences also within the state actors category. Therefore it is possible to characterised three main groups of actors: developed states that have reached a national identity and stability and are fully acquainted with the information age and the global economy peculiarities; states that are still fighting to define their own national identity, territory and stability and which are starting to deal with the information age attributes and armed non-state actors which in many cases are taking advantage of the information age characteristics.
Victory for the developed countries, that are everyday more interconnected and based on the global market economy, is no more a matter of physical territories because the main focus is maintaining the equilibrium of the international arena and reaffirm the information dominance 6. For them, victory is related to the preservation and enchantment of the international political and economical stability that permeates the interaction within the global market and marks their role in the information society. The use of force as a mean of international policy is seen as an instrument to spread this objective versus those countries that can compromise this stability. In the resolution of conflicts with interconnected peer states this type of state actors prefer the diplomatic way and therefore victory is achieved via accommodation through negotiation. In the conflict with other nations not considered peer or armed non-state actors their idea of victory fluctuates respectively from the subdue of the other will, halt or disarming the enemy and return the situation to a more formal political framework (as it can be seen in international intra-state conflicts) or total eradication (as it can be can be noticed in the US “war” on terror rhetoric).
Those countries that have not achieved yet a certain level of stability are, on the other side, more subjected to idealise victory as the complete submission of the opponent and/or a territory and in this respect they share this belief with some major armed non-state actors. In this category can be framed most of the intra-state civil wars challengers and this can be explained by the historical and situational context of these actors. Considering armed non-state actors, the concept of victory is mainly denoted by several religious and ideological factors and in most of the cases contemplates the total submission of the adversary culture and the establishment of an ideological supremacy.
As it can be noticed, victory does not have a unique meaning in the contemporary world because it depends on the different objectives and reasons behind the use and the initiation of a conflict. As it can be observed its nature is double bounded with historical and situational context and directly related to the impact that the conflict can have on the international arena. Victory cannot be defined in an unique way since in the contemporary world different actors at different stage of their socio-political evolution are interconnected.
Clearly the concept of victory has changed even if it must be underlined that this change is not universal but subject to several variables as it was suggested above. What it is out of doubt is that the main international actors share a common blurred concept of victory. Victory to be recognised as such must not put in discussion the system of values of the global society. This is because the resolution to the force is considered as a shame for most of the developed countries which must consider not only economical, social, political, diplomatic, military and informational variables (Mandel, 2007) but also the public opinion and in particular the impact on the interconnected and global arena. Moreover victory is no more a matter of territory but more the balance of different interconnected elements where the point is not only the submission of the will of the adversary but the impact of the conflict on the equilibrium of the international community.
At the same time it can be observed that the inner essence of victory has not changed since, spoiled of all contextual influences, remains always the change of the will of a counter group of human beings. Whatever RMAs or new battlefields are available, its inner essence remains the same. This can be recognised in the integration of information warfare (IW) into the traditional warfare doctrine as it is underlined in the statements of two prominent and opposite representatives of the two main military doctrines, chinese Major General Wang Pufeng and US General T. Michael Moseley:
‘‘Information warfare constitutes a networkization of the battlefield, and a new model for the complete contest of time and space. At its center is the fight to control the information battlefield and thereby to influence or decide victory or defeat’’7 (Pufeng)
“No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority.” 8(Moseley)
In these statements it can be notices how cyberspace is recognised as the virtual battlespace (McEvoy, 2010) and how IW influences the chances of victory or defeat. It is an extension and integration of the traditional battlespace and due to the dependency of the adversary in this sphere and consequently on its role in the global and interconnected society, it can play a strategic role in the achievement of the victory.
In conclusion, to answer the question on how information society and information warfare influences achieving the victory, it must be noticed that IW influences it but it must be also remembered that the information society, as the WSIS define it, is at its early stage and not spread at the same level in every country. On one side we have the rising power of the new ICT and the almost immediate media coverage of any international event, on the other side we have a full spectrum of techniques and areas that can take full advantage of these key characteristics. So it can be concluded that victory in the contemporary world cannot be uniquely defined and is no more achieved with only a full display of kinetic power but it is achieved with a strategic use of information warfare within the traditional warfare in a measure related to the dependency of the adversary on the information society and on the historical and situational context.
1 WSIS (2003) “Declaration of Principles - Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium” http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/genea/official/dop.html Last retrieved on 20th of May 2011
2 European Commission - Information society http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/index_en.htm Last retrieved on 20th of May 2011
3 George F. Kennan, (1984) “American Diplomacy, “ Walgreen Foundation Lectures, p 102
4 Robert Mandel, (2007) “Reassessing Victory in Warfare”, Armed Forces & Society http://afs.sagepub.com/content/33/4/461 p 469
5 Schneckener, Ulrich, (2007)“Armed Non-State Actors and the Monopoly of Force”, Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), p 11
6 Mary McEvoy Manjikian (2010) “From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace: The Colonizing of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik”, International Studies Quarterly, p 397
7 John Arquilla and Solomon M. Karmel, (1997)“Welcome to the Revolution … in Chinese Military Affairs,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 259.
8 Moseley, Michael. (2007) The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force. www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf p 2, Last retrieved on 20th of May 2011
@1 year ago
Changes in warfare are double binded with changes in the society. Both warfare and society are manifestations of the human being and in doing so they reflect the evolution of the humanity. This road was not always linear: the evolution of the society from primitive tribes to contemporary world has gone through several paradigm shifts and this was reflected also in warfare. At the same time the essence of both remained unchanged and principles that were valid in the antiquity are still valid nowadays.
Looking back at the antiquity we can find several concepts that are still in use today in the various component of warfare. Sun Zi’s “The Art of War” was so advance and sophisticated that is a must read also today. His attitude to war, deception, discipline and how to destroy the enemy trying to avoid the battle are nowadays more contemporary if we think about the disruption of critical infrastructure in order to hurt the enemy.
Ancient greeks put the basis for the european attitude to warfare and introduced some key concepts as envoys, preventive war and mercenaries. Romans maximized discipline combined with strong organisation of all aspects involved in warfare including logistics and training. Mongols refined the concepts of manoeuvre and terror with the use of fire and rapidity of deployment.
As it can be noticed organised society in states or empires were the foundation of advanced warfare and this is why in the medieval Europe we can notice a step backward due to the fragmentation of the territory and lack of centralisation.
Scholars usually trace major changes and the origin of modern warfare starting from the formation of states following the Italian princely states. For Murray and Knox 1 the main background changes or anticipatory “revolutions in the military affairs” in the middle ages and early modern era have been the improvement of the longbow, the offensive-defensive strategy, the evolution of gunpowder and new fortress architecture (Murray and Knox, p13). It can be noticed how these were not invented in that period but can be traced back since antiquity and reached through improvements, at that moment, their enabling point.
These improvements were led by key figures as Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus for discipline and military organization and later Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban concerning scientific innovations. They paved the way to the “first military revolution” (Murray and Knox, p13): the creation in the seventeenth century of the modern nation-state which led to large and disciplined army that from that moment would have characterised warfare.
Other major changes, in fact, or as Murray and Knox describe them “associated and resultants revolution in military affairs” were French tactical and organizational reforms, naval revolution and British’s financial revolution followed by the French military reforms after the Seven Year’s war (Murray and Knox, p 13). As it is clear these reforms were not technological but tactical, financial and organizational and were reflecting the changes of the social context.
Two key figures for the next most significant changes were Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte.The first embodied the territorial state approach while the second the national state approach and both introduced a new way of looking at warfare.
Frederick the Great introduced the permanent army and switched the focus from his role to the state. He refined the strategy of exhaustion and start to fight for geopolitic and economical purposes. Famous for his tough discipline, his awareness of the territory and balanced governance of the national resources perfectly underline the matrix of his changes.
Napeoleon Bonaparte incarnated the new spirit of national states, war was no more a king’s matter but a people’s matters and with strongly motivated and organised mass formations. He gave a new meaning to the strategy of annihilation and completely changed the concept of logistics as represented in one of Emperor’s favourite maxim “War must feed war!” 2.
These changes and the new territorial and social context that was developing embody, in fact, what Murray and Knox define as the “second and third military revolutions”: the French and industrial revolutions. If the first one “merged mass politics and warfare” (Murray and Knox, p. 6) the second adapted the industrial approach to operational, administrative and logistics aspects of warfare. This revolutions were associated and followed by other revolutions in military affaires such as the global mobilisation of an entire state at its national, political and economical levels, the financial and economic power in Britain, the technological revolution in land warfare and transports and the Fisher revolution in naval warfare (Murray and Knox, p 13).
As Martin van Creveld underlines about Heinrich Dietrich von Buelow, the first turning point in strategy at the end of the eighteenth century was the use of maps: “ Strategy, then, was the art of conducting war not by means of coup d’oeil from behind a horse’s ears but in an office, on the surface of a map “ 3.
Considering this context is out of doubt that Carl Von Clausewitz’s “On War” marked a major change in thinking warfare or as Watson wrote: “the most impressive attempt to think through the function of the resort to force as an instrument of state policy within a diplomatic system based on an equilibrium of power” 4.
Clausewitz insight gave a new definition of war and marked the beginning of the modern strategy. His writings perfectly theorised the new nature of war as a social phenomena that is not related to one’s will but to the nation’s will and defined a whole range of concepts that are still in use nowadays.
US civil war embodies all these changes and was the sum of the french and industrial revolution with the use of mass forces, use and corruption of infrastructures and introduction of technology innovations. US civil war was also the precursor on what we would have seen in World War I such for example trench warfare and several other military technologies.
As it can be easily understood World War I marked another paradigm shift, or as Murray and Knox define “the fourth military revolution”(Murray and Knox p. 6). In WWI we saw armies in a scale never experience before and the incarnation of all previous revolutions. It also constituted the base for what would be used during World War II. The use of air and automobile, the use of chemical weapons and new communications technology, the use of early tanks and the evolution of artillery techniques: all these elements were used or, as it could be said looking back after WWII, were tested during WWI.
In fact, during the interwar period most of what was used in WWI was analysed and set the stage for WWII combined arms tactics and operations, Blitzkrieg operation, strategic bombing, carrier warfare, deep operations, submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, radars and signal intelligence. These improvements led to the biggest crash of nations that humanity ever experienced, a conflict which probably reached what, in Clausewitz’s terms, can be defined as the nearest example of escalation without limit to utter destruction and physical exhaustion.
With the introduction of nuclear weapons which Murray and Knox define as the “fifth revolution” (Murray and Knox p. 6), the war ended and the context changed again. Two new main factors entered the scene: containment and multilateral alliances for preservation of the international order. Then the information technologies revolution brought precision guided munitions, near real time management and instant information diffusion and use of satellite redefined the approach to tactics and strategy.
If the transformation from the territorial states to the national states made the war a national matter, the scenario after cold war made the war a national matter in the international market. This not only affected the way wars are fought: as we can see from the Human Security Report 2009/2010 5 it also affected the nature of wars since interstate conflict have diminished and now the focus are intrastate conflicts.
The world in which we live is experiencing a paradigm shift, as the one from territorial state to nation state, we are now passing from national state to the interconnected glocal 6 world. The part of the world that has already reached its nation state maturity is represented by interconnected super power states that have no interest in fight each other while the part that is still looking for its nation state maturity is the one where intrastate conflicts occur. Both of them have in common one threat: ideology. And since “ideology is not concerned with territory or interests. It is a belief - often a burning conviction about what is morally wrong and right”(Wilson, p 69) both of them share a significant change: asymmetric warfare 7.
Considering all these changes, from antiquity to the contemporary world it is clear that “the concentrated and disciplined use of armed force to achieve political ends, has been and still is one instrument by which states seek to persuade one another”(Wilson, p 59). Many several changes have happened but what has really changed in the contemporary world is that states are no more the only actors in the warfare scene as it can be noticed in terroristic attacks.
In conclusion it is clear that several major changes have happened from antiquity to the modern days: they were the results of the evolution of society, they reflected the evolution of how human beings organize themselves in societies and of their technology and paradigms. At the same time the inner essence of warfare remains unchanged since warfare is a human act and human nature has not changed but what have changed is “just” the way human beings organise themselves.
1MacGregor, Knox; Williamson, Murray; ” The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050”, Cambridge University Press, 2001
2 Lanfrey, Pierre, “The History of Napoleon the First: 1808-1811”, MacMillan, 1886, p 379
3 Van Creveld, Martin, “Art of War: War and Military Thought “, McArthur & Company, 2000, p 100
4 Watson, Adam, “Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States”, Routledge, 1984, p 58
5 “Human Security Report 2009/2010 “, Simon Fraser University, 2010, Figure 10,1 “Trends in state based armed conflicts”
6 Roudometof, Victor. “Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Glocalization.” Current Sociology 53.1, 2005, p 113-135.
7 Stepanova, Ekaterina,”Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: SIPRI Report 23”, Oxford University Press, 2008, p 18
@1 year ago
Internet Filtering
According to the latest Internet usage statistics, Iran represents the 52% of the users of the Middle East with 33,200,000 users. On one hand, Iran leads the Internet penetration in these countries; on the other hand, it is ranks as World’s Worst Internet Oppressor in 2011 by Freedom House report. In fact, the Internet filtering is a common practice in Iran since 2002. It became more vigorous in 2003 and definitively become a tool of repression in 2009. It is not the purpose here to enter into technical details on how the Internet is filtered but three main factors must be underlined: the use of indigenous ad-hoc solutions; the reinforcement of the keywords filtering with the use of individuals reviewing websites from the Islamic perspective and the practice to trace users connections and habits blocking and unblocking access to specific sites and social networks.
Internet filtering is more common that one would expect, especially in the Middle Eastern countries. The peculiarities of the Iranian approach are the main technology, which is developed by an Iranian company Amnafzar and the structure of the filtering organization. The fact that this technology is indigenous can help to identify two main characteristics of the Persian filtering approach: the will to totally acknowledge the filtering chain from user to the backbone (western internet filtering tools were not sold to the Iranian government like Nokia Siemens and Smartfilter for this purpose) and also that the real sophistication of this filter can be supposed to be much lower than state of the art enterprise technologies represented in the Gartner Leaders Quadrant for Content Monitoring and Filtering.
The complexity of the Internet is difficult to be framed with a non state-of-the-art filtering technology based on keywords so it is understandable that the Iranian government needs to reinforce the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Websites policies with the use of individuals grouped under the National filtering Intelligence Bank.
Farnaz Selfi describes that after the identification of possible “immoral” websites by search robot “compiled list (of websites) are given to various industries, such as doctors, psychiatrist, clergymen, sociologist, intelligence personnel and so on. These members would then assess which site(s) should then be filtered.”
Another point to underline is the usage of the internet filtering to understand users’ behaviour and connections. The international social networking site Facebook, for example was first blocked, then un-blocked and then blocked again giving the skilled Iranian intelligence the chance to trace behaviour. This gives the possibility not only to reinforce online repression but also to understand how different users are connected and observe their relationship and interactions.
Iranian Cyber Army
Another meaning of the Internet for the Iranian government is the “virtual battlefield” where the Iranian Cyber Army can openly hack opposition websites, Iranian websites critical of the government, western websites guilty of denigrating the regime or impersonating the “un-Islamic values” and highly known websites. As stated by the Commander Javani, head of the Revolutionary Guards political bureau, ICA aims to “prevent the destruction of Iran’s cultural and social system”. There are several repercussions behind this statement: this army is backed by the government which means that they can openly hack (even if it supposed to be forbidden in Iran) without worrying about domestic or international legal repercussions and they can also openly become a model for young Iranians as it can be noticed in what it is called the Iranian Cyber Army Facebook page. Another fundamental point is the religious and political essence of this army as it can be noticed in the Google result for Twitter during the defacement attack in 2009:
“In the name of God, as an Iranian this is a reaction to Twitter’s interference sly which was U.S. authorities ordered in the internal affairs of my country…”.
Even if the complexity of the attacks reveals an army at its early stage it is clear that this is the beginning of a new era of threats in the cyberspace where cyber criminal groups are backed by government to hack other countries’ websites. Moreover due to the nature of the battlefield and the characteristic of the army these actions are not recognized as an act of hostility even if reported by Azad Cyber:
“Now that one of the authorities of Sepah has openly declared that Iranian Cyber Army was established by Sepah, the websites, such as, Baidu and Twitter, are able to make legal complaints to International Organizations like ITU against Iranian Cyber Army’s operations”.
Halal Internet
For the first time after the advent of the Internet there is a government that openly talks about the creation of a clean Internet or a national Intranet that could also be extended to other Islamic countries. This claim marks a further step in the Iranian approach to the cyber space, even if in a world so interconnected as the contemporary one the possibility of creating a national intranet is highly remote (but not impossible). The idea to create such an environment represents a threat not only to the Iranian society but also to the rest of world because it could constitute a precedent. As stated by Ali Aghamohammadi, the current head of economic affairs, this intranet would aim to “conform to Islamic principles, to improve its communication and trade links with the world”. If the Iranian government is to succeed, they would have full control of every information in the national cyberspace and could block any ‘un-Islamic” interference in the Iranian society, completely denying the principles of openness and sharing that are at the root of the information society.
Conclusion
Despite the flat and transparent nature of the Internet, the Iranian Government consider it a tool of repression. In a way totally opposite to the perception of this medium by the civil society, the political class and in particular the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution use the unique possibilities of the network technologies to filter, repress and fight against not only the Persian civil society but also other countries.
Internet, for the current Iranian government, is an entirely new space to filter, to use as a weapon and to re-frame into the Islamic culture. In doing so they see the Internet’s three different capabilities: Internet as a place to filter “immoral” and “un-Islamic” sites and control citizens’ online behaviour; Internet as a place where they can fight with unconventional methods and without openly lose the face in front the international arena, Internet as a place where they can create a virtual space that is completely adherent to the Islamic principles, not only for the Persian population but for all the Islamic countries.
But much more important they are strongly committed to create a self sufficient cyberspace, which comprise not only a a national internet but a comprehensive self sufficient set of software tools as stated by Gholam Reza Jalali, the commander of the Iranian civil defence organization: “The final solution to problems of [cyberdefense and the] formation of Jihad, is to achieve economic self-sufficiency in the production of basic software such as operating systems and software.”
If they achieve in doing this they will not only give a precedent to follow for other countries that are working in this direction as Russia, China and North Korea but we will also have a country that has no problem attacking the Internet or other countries Critical Information Infrastructures because it does not depend on the interdependencies of the network sociey anymore.
Iran can be seen as a compendium of the cyber threats we will have to face in future: filtering, cyber army and self suffiency techno system. Network techonologies gave us the means to create the information society but the same means can be used to control and deny the possibilities of this rising society. It is about us, the international Internet community, to work to preserve the open, trasnational and interconnected nature of the cyberspace and do not let the creation of national, close and disconnected cyberspaces.
If a country succeed in doing this, we will not only deny the fundamentals of the Internet but we will also lose the chance to build a future global and interconnected society based on openness, cooperation and free flow of information.
@11 months ago
CIIRs are “Those interconnected information systems and networks, the disruption or destruction of which would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens, or on the effective functioning of government or the economy” but how in a world every day more complex can we really secure them?
Several governments and multilateral organizations are trying to understand how to protect them and provide the security and stability that has allowed us to reach this point.
A good beginning in Europe are the outcomes of the“EU CIIP Achievements and next steps” and the “principles and guidelines for the resilience and stability of the Internet”
These two documents give a clear overview of what should be done in terms of policy and organization although they lack of one point: there is no claim about who should operationally coordinate the system in case of a trasnational outage.
After the establishment of national CERTs and relative national Information Sharing and Alert System (ISAS) within European Information Sharing and Alert System (EISAS) one of the most critical point will be the establishment of a transnational CERT, first european and after global with the aim of coordinating the efforts of the different actors in case of trasnational outages.
Resources:
Baseline capabilities for national / governmental CERTs (Part 1 Operational Aspects)
EISAS European Information Sharing and Alert System Roadmap
FISHA - Framework for Information Sharing and Alerting
NEISAS National and European Information Sharing and Alerting
EU-US Working Group on Cyber-security
Meridian process
Wishlist:
EWNI 2011
2nd European Workshop on Internet Early Warning and Network Intelligence
July 06, 2011 Amsterdam, The Netherlands (canceled)
CRITIS’11
6th international conference on critical information infrastructures security
September 8-9, 2011 Lucerne, Switzerland
@1 year ago
